We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public moni toring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more fa miliar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (U) the equilibrhun final period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.
Introduction
A repeated game has public monitoring if, after each period, each player observes the same signal of that period's action profile. The most easily studied sequential equilibria of these games are those in which each player's strategy is public, i.e., depends only on the history of public signals. These "perfect public equilibria" have been studied prominently by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) and Fu denberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) . However, if the monitoring is imperf,ect, sequential equilibria may exist in which players use "private strategies" that de pend on privately known past actions in addition to publicly known past signals. We refer to these equilibria as private sequential equilibria.
In this paper we provide three examples to illustrate features that distinguish private sequential equilibria from perfect public equilibria. These distinctions appear even in finitely repeated games. In our examples a stage game is played twice, with the players observing a public signal of the first-period actions.
In each example a private sequential equilibrium exists that Pareto dominates every perfect public equilibrium and, indeed, every subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding game with perfect monitoring. The examples thus show that if a repeated game's public signal is made less informative, new sequential equilibrium payoffs can arise that are not in the convex hull of the original game's set of sequential equilibrium payoffs. This is in contrast to the opposite result obtained by Kandori (1992) for perfect public equilibria. l Our first two examples show that the following well-known result also does not extend to private sequential equilibria: If the stage game of a finitely repeated game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then the unique perfect public equilibrium of the finitely repeated game consists of playing the stage-game equilibrium in every period after any history. In contrast, our first two examples have unique stage game equilibria, and nonetheless exhibit private sequential equilibria in which the stage-game equilibrium is not played in each period. In the second example, the stage game's Nash equilibrium is also its only correlated equilibrium.
In the first example, the unique stage-game equilibrium is played in the first period but not in the second. Instead, a non-Nash correlated equilibrium of the stage game is played in the second period. This is possible because the stage game's Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies. When it is played in the first period, each player's realized first-period action becomes his private information.
In the second period, after also observing the realization of the public signal, each player has a strict best response that depends on both his first-period action and the public signal. The random first-period actions and the public signal together constitute an appropriate correlating device for the second-period play. This is like the "internal correlation" ·of Lehrer (1991) , as we discuss in Section 6.
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In the second example, unlike in: the first, the unique stage-game correlated equilibrium is not played in the first period. Inste&d, player 2 plays another mixed strategy in the first period. Her second-period st.J;ategy is pure, and it determines her action as a function of her realized first...;peripd action and the public signal. 3 These two random variables are independent if pl&):'er1 does not deviate in the first period. If player 1 does deviate in the first perio<l, player 2's first-period action', and the public signal become correlated. Moreover, since player 2's second-period' , action depends on her first-period action and the signal, this correlation causes player 2 to play (with high probability) an action that is particularly bad for 'player L This "unwitting punishment" deters player 1 from deviating in the first pM~d.'.
The third example, like the second, is of a private sequential equilibrium in which first-period play is not a stage-game equilibrium. A deviation in the first period is deterred by subsequent play that is not a stage-game correlated equi librium. The example appe~ ,~o be more robust than the second example to perturbations of signals and payoffs. Rather than being inspired by purification, it uses arguments that rely on there being at least three players. The presentation starts with a signal that has the property that while any unilateral deviatIon is obs~rved, the deviator's identity is not. The resulting game has a pure-strategy private sequential equilibrium that Pareto dominates every perfect public equi librium. The equilibrium is in pure strategies, and does not entail the play of a stage-game equilibrium in the first period-:-even though the stage game has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium payoff veCtor. The relevant deviation (by player 3) from the private sequential equilibdufll is deterred because when he deviates, the other players' beliefs differ as to the 'probable identity of the deviator,and so of continuation play. While this equilibrium is not robust to perturbing the probabilities so that the signalhas non-moving support, there is a similar private sequential equilibrium in mixed strateiies that is:' 2 It is not true that private strategies allow anything to happen in the last period: on the equilibrium path of any sequential equilibrium of a finitely repeated game with public monitor ing,.conditional on the signal a correlated equilibrj.um is played in the laSt period (Proposition 2 below).
.... aOn the equilibr.ium path, player 2'r;; pure second-period strategy purifies her mixed stage game equilibrium strategy.
4Some of the logic of this example appears in Marx and Matthews (2000) for a dynaniic, non
The next section presents preliminary material.· The examples are presented in the three subsequent sections. The final section discusses related literature, and the appendix considers the robustness of the second example.
Preliminaries
The set of players is N {I, ... ,n}. The stage game isa strategic form game It is well known that in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, any out come of a pure strategy sequential equilibrium is also the outcome of a PPE outcome. It is worth emphasizing that this result requires the support of the signal to not vary with the action profile. The precise statement of this result in our setting is the following proposition. repeated game with noiseless imperfect public monitoring. A similar repeated-game example is in Matthews (1998) , which has been subsumed by this paper.
Proof. Let (J be a sequential equilibrium in which, say, a E A is surely played in the first period. Since any signal is realized with positive probability after any action profile, even if player i plays ~ =1= ~ in the first period, he must still believe the others will play the profile «(J1 (aj, y)) j"ci in the second period, given any realization y E Y. His best action after he plays ai in the first period is hence a best reply to «(JJ(aj, Y))j:f.i. One best reply to this profile is his equilibrium--path strategy, (J;(ai' y). Thus, replacing player i's second-period action (J;(ai' y) by (J;(ai, y) for every ~ E Ai yields a public strategy ai from which player i has no incentive to deviate. This shows that (ai,(J-i) is a sequential equilibrium that has the same outcome as does (J. Continuing in this fashion for all the players yields a PPE a with the same outcome as (J.
• Perfect public equilibria are relatively tractable because they have a recursive formulation (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) ). For a once-repeated stage game, this recursive formulation takes the following form: given any PPE (J and signal Y E Y, the distribution (J2(y) of the second-period action profile conditional on y is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Thus, even after a one-shot deviation in the first period, second-period play conditional on the signal is a stage-game equilibrium.
There is no analogous simple recursive formulation for private sequential equi libria. Conditional ona signal realization, a PSE need not yield a stage-game equilibrium in the second period, even on the eqUilibrium path. In fact, if a player makes a one-shot deviation in the first period, second-period play, condi tional on the signal realization, need not even be a correlated equilibrium. Our second and third examples rely on this property. The only recursiveness neces sarily exhibited by a PSE is that of any Nash equilibrium, which is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let (J be a Nash equilibrium of G(1[, V). IE Y E Y is realized
with positive probability in this equilibrium, then the equilibrium distribution of second-period actions, conditional on y, is a correlated equilibrium of G.
The conditional distribution over second-period action profiles, p(a 2 1 y), is a correlated equilibrium of G if for all 5The essential idea is that if an action is a best reply after two different histories, and so potentially to two different beliefs over the opponents' play, then that action is a best reply to any average of those beliefs. This logic is much the same as the "obedience" part of the general revelation principle of Myerson (1982) .
(1)
The maximand in (1) can be written as
Hence (1) holds if, for all at E At, 
Since (4) Multiplying the maximand in (4) by the positive term pea; Iy) yields that of (2), and we are done.
•
Internal Correlation
The stage game of this section's example is shown below.
0,0 1,2 2,1 2,1 0,0 1,2 1,2 2,1 0,0
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in which each player plays each action with probability 1/3. The resulting payoff vector is (1,1). Non-Nash correlated equilibria also exist, one of which is the following distribution on A :
This correlated equilibrium gives rise to the payoff vector (3/2,3/2).
The public signal (11", Y) is defined in terms of a partition, {AI, A2, A3}, of A, where
The set of possible signals is Y = {Yll Y2, Ya}, and the signal distribution is given by 1/2, if a rf-Ak,
Thus, conditional on the signal and his own action, a player can rule out one action of the opponent. For example, if player 1 observes Y2 after choosing Ti, he knows player 2 did not choose Si+I.
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We now describe a profile a = (aI, ( 2 ) of private strategies in which the stage-game Nash eqUilibrium is played in the first period, and the correlated equilibrium shown in (6) is played in the second period. The profile is given by OWe use the convention that the first action follows the third.
We now argue that this profile is a sequential equilibrium. Consider first the sequential rationality of play in the second period. If y1
Yb then player I, having played Ti in the first period, has the ex post belief that player 2 played Si+! with probability 1/2 and Si-1 with probability 1/2. From (9), player 1 thus believes that 2 will play Si+! with probability 1/2 and Si-1 with probability 1/2 in the second period. Given this belief, it is sequentially rational to play Ti again in the second period, as specified by O' i. A similar argument applies to player 2 after the signal yl = Y1.
If y1 Y2, player 1, having played Ti in the first period, believes that 2 played Bi with probability 1/2 and 8i-1 with probability 1/2. Thus by (9), he assigns equal probability to player 2, in the second period, playing Si+1 and Si, and so playing Ti-1 is optimal. On the other hand, player 2 who played Sj believes that 1 played Tj with probability 1/2 and Tj+1 with probability 1/2. By (8), player 2 therefore believes that 1 plays each of Tj-1 and Tj with probability 1/2. It is thus sequentially rational to play Sj+! given this belief. The case where y1 = Y3 is established through a similar argument.
Finally, no player has an incentive to deviate in the first period. Each player's continua.tion payoff under the profile in the second period is independent of history, being equal to 3/2. Since the choice of action in the first period has no payoff implications in the second period, it is a best response if it maximizes first-period payoffs, which it does. This example is robust in the sense that a similar non-trivial equilibrium is ob tained even if we perturb the initial monitoring structure 1r. To see this, note that play in the second period given 0' and any history remains sequentially rational under any monitoring structure sufficiently close to 11", because each 0'7 (a; ,y1) is a strict best response given the beliefs. This is so even if each player's first-period strategy is not equal to (1/3,1/3,1/3), but is sufficiently close to it.
Suppose now that the players are restricted to play 0'2 in the second period. This yields a one-shot game in which only the first-period actions are chosen. Its unique equilibrium is 0'1 = ((1/3,1/3,1/3), (1/3, 1/3,1/3)). Therefore, under any monitoring structure sufficiently close to 11", there exists an equilibrium 0'''' of this game that is close to 0'1. By the above argument, the strategy profile in which the players play 0'''' in the first period and then 0'2 in the second period is an equilibrium if the monitoring structure is sufficiently close to 11".
Unwitting Punishment
The stage game of this section's example, based on that of Kandori (1991) , is shown below. In this game rg is strictly dominated, and its removal causes 8g and 84 to become strictly dominated. The unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium is for each player to play each of his first two actions with equal probability. The equilibrium payoff vector is (3,3). Profiles (rg , 8g) and (ra,84) are desirable, but
are not equilibria because player 1 has an incentive to deviate to r2. We now present a signal structure such that the two-period game has aPSE inwhich, in the first period, player 1 plays rg and player 2 plays 8g and 84 with equal probability.
The public signal structure is given by Y = {yt, yll} , and the following table 
Thus, if player 1 plays r2 and player 2 randomizes between 8a and 84, the public signal is perfectly correlated with player 2's action-player 1 will then surely learn whether 8g or 84 was played. But if player 1 plays rg (or rl), the signal and player 2's action are independent, and player 1 will learn nothing from the signal about player 2's action.
The candidate strategy for player 1, 0"1. requires that he pJay rg in the first period:
O"i (ra) = 1.
In the second period he plays rl and r2 with equal probability, provided he played rg or rl in the first period. If he deviated to r2 in the first period, he plays r2 in the second:
and (7I(r21 rl, y On the equilibrium path of (7, conditional on either signal realization, the stage-game equilibrium is played in the second period (a.., required by Proposition 2). In particular, player 1 is content to play rl and r2 with equal probability because the signal is uninformative about player 2's past action, and hence about her second-period action, even though she is actually using a pure strategy in the second period. Her fifty-fifty mixture of S1 and S2 is purified by her random first-period action and the signal.
However, if player 1 deviates in the first period to his myopic best reply T2, the· continuation play conditional on either signal realization is not even a correlated equilibrium of the stage game: (r2,82) is played after either y' or y". If, for example, y' is realized after player 1 deviates to r2, he will know that player 2's first-period action was 83, and hence that she will surely play S2, and so r2 is his only best reply. Player 2 is nonetheless still content to play 82 after (S3, y'); observing y' does not reveal to her that player 1 deviated, and so she still believes he is playing the fifty-fifty mixture of rl and T2.
It is now easy to see why player 1 does not deviate to r2 in the first period, and hence that (7 is a PSE. This deviation results in the play of (r2' S2) instead of the stage-game equilibrium in the second period, and so it costs him 3 1 = 2 utiles. This is more than his myopic gain from the deviation, 11 -1 = L He thus has a strict incentive not to deviate from (7 in the first period.
We made this example non-symmetric only for convenience; a symmetric ex ample with the same features can be obtained from the authors. The example is also robust in the following sense: any game obtained by slightly perturbing either the payoffs or the signal probabilities has a PSE close to (7. However, this is not true if both structures are perturbed. In the Appendix we show that almost all small perturbations of the payoffs and probabilities together yield a game that has a unique sequential equilibrium, the perfect public equilibrium in which the stage-game equilibrium is played after any history. We conjecture that if a two-player finitely-repeated game with public monitoring has a stage game with generic payoff and signal probability structures, and if the stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium, then that correlated equilibrium is played after any history in the unique sequential equilibrium of the repeated game. We have no conjecture if the number of players is greater than two.
Punishment by Disparate Beliefs
There are three players in this section's example. Each player has two actions, c and d. The stage game is shown below, with player 3 choosing the left or right matrix by his choice of c or d, respectively. In any once-repeated game G(1T:, Y) based on this stage game, when player 3 plays d in the second period, each player's payoff is maximized by the outcome
0: == ((c, c, c) , (c, d, d)) .
The outcome 0: is not a PPE outcome. Recall that PPE requires, upon the real ization of any signal, even off-the-equilibrium path, that a stage-game equilibrium be played in the second period. Player 3 can thus be punished by at most the maximal difference in his stage-game equilibrium payoffs, 12 -8~ = 3~, which is less than his gain of 9 obtained by playing d rather than c in the first period. It follows that ((c, d, d) , (c, d, d) ) is a Pareto dominant PPE outcome. 7 Since this outcome is Pareto dominated by 0:, every PPE outcome of any of the games
G(1T:, Y) is Pareto dominated by 0:.

A payoff-equivalent PPE outcome is «d, c, d), Cd, c, d»).
On the other hand, player 3 would not deviate to d in the first period if doing so caused the second-period profile to switch from (c, d, d) to (d, d, d) .8 While this is impossible in a PPE, it is possible in a PSE given an appropriate signaling structure, as we now show. 
This completes the definition of s. Observe that its outcome is at, and that (d, d, d) is played in the second period if player 3 deviates to d in the first. It follows that s is a Nash equilibrium.
To show that 8 is a PSE profile, suppose each of players 1 and 2 believes, when he takes action c in the first period and observes y = 2, that player 3 was the player who chose the other c. A deviation by player 3 then causes players 1 and 2 to each believe the other was the deviator (when in fact it was player 3). Given (11), each of players 1 and 2 then believes the other will play c, and so his best reply is d. These beliefs thus make (d, d, d) sequentially rational in· the second period if player 3 unilaterally deviates in the first.
To complete the argument that 8 is a sequential equilibrium profile, we now show that the assessment obtained by pairing s with the specified beliefs is con sistent. For c > 0, define the following profile of mixed first-period strategies:
llIndeed, if the monitoring is perfect, the path 7t, together with (d, d, d ) after any deviation, constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
As € --+ 0, (TI,e --+ (e, e, e) . Let (T2.e be any completely mixed second-period strategy profile for which (T2,e --+ '8 2 . Then ~ == «(Tl,e, (T2,e) --+ '8. To prove consistency, we need only verify that the limiting belief, as € --+ 0, of both players 1 and 2 after a history (e,2) is that. player 3 chose the other e. When (Te is played; each of players 1 and 2 has the following belief after history (e,2):
(1 -c:
2 ) c:
Pr{3 chose e , e, 2} = ( 2) 2 (1 ) l-c: c:+c:
As this converges to 1, s paired with the specified beliefs is indeed consistent.
Remark. The punishment of player 3 in this equilibrium is sequentially rational only because, if he deviates, his identity as the deviator is not detectable. Neither other player knows it was player 3 who deviated; and so neitl~er knows (d, d, d ) will be played -each thinks the other will play c. This confusion is a lack of coordinar tion that allows (d, d, d) to be sequentially rationaL In contrast, most, if not all, of the previous literature is motivated by the observation that imperfect detection of deviators can make it difficult to coordinate on punishing profiles. Assumptions are thus made to insure that monit.oring is not too imperfect, so that a deviation and the deviator's identity are statistically detectable, and punishment can be coordinated. 11 The logic of our example shows instead that imperfect monitoring can sometimes increase punishment levels because it impedes coordination.
The profile s remains a sequential equilibrium if the payoffs are perturbed, but not if the signaling structure is perturbed. It is easy to show that if 1f is any "full support" perturbation of 1f, in the sense that 1f(Y ,.) > 0 for all y E Y, then no sequential equilibrium outcome of G(1f, Y) is close to a:. (This is in accordance with Proposition 1, since S has pure first-period strategies, but a non PPE outcome.) However, another PSE is robust to perturbations of the signal distribution.
Denoting it as (j, it is the same as s in the second period, and in the first period 9Less extreme beliefs can also be paired with s to obtain a consistent assessment. It is sufficient for each of players 1 and 2, after history (c,2), to believe player 3 played c with probability p :2' : 1/3. To obtain the appropriate trembles, replace a}E with (1 e{l -p)/p) 0 c+c(1 p)/pod. lOIn fact, s is even an (extensive-form trembling-hand) perfect equilibrium, since s is a best reply to o-E for small e. 11 For example, Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) assume "individual full rank" and "pairwise identifiability", and Mailath and Morris (1999) The nature of 0' is similar to that of s. It too has the property that a first period deviation by player 3 causes (d, d, d) to be subsequently played with high probability, now .81 instead of 1. Also like 5, 0' Pareto dominates any PPE of any of the games C (1C', Y) . The fact that 0' is a Nash equilibrium is obvious. It is thus a sequential equilibrium, since now the only problematic signal realization, y = 2, occurs with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Moreover, 0' is robust to any small perturbation of ft, and it is a perfect equilibrium of C(ft, Y):
Proof. For large k, the first-period part of player 3's strategy, O'A, is a strict best reply to 0' in C (1C'k, Y) , Since O'~ always puts all probability on d and is hence a second-period best reply to any profile, 0'3 is thus a best reply in C(1C'k, Y) to any profile in a neighborhood of 0'. We can thus fix player 3's strategy at 0'3 in C( 1C'k, Y) and consider the resulting game between players 1 and 2, denoted C k , Let C kl be the one-shot game obtained from C k by fixing the second-period strategies at 0':'3 = (O'i,O'~), For large k, Cit! is the same as the original stage game, with player 3's action fixed at c, except that a number near 1 is added to each of the payoffs of players 1 and 2. The profile 0'~_3 = (O'~, O'~) is an equilibrium of this one-shot game if precisely 1 is added to each of their payoffs. Since a completely mixed equilibrium of a 2 x 2 game that has no dominant strategies is continuous in payoffs, Cltl has an equilibrium (J'~13 close to 0':3'
By the argument just given, each first-period strategy in this profile is a best reply to (J'~3 in the two-period game C k . For large k, since (1C'It, (J'~~) is close to (ft, 0':3)' when (J'~13 is played in Cit, Bayes' rule implies that for i =J j = 1,2, Pr(a} = d I at = c, y = 2) is close to 1, and so an 1 c, 2) is a strict best reply to O' r in the second period. Similarly, for large k the strategy 0';(·1 d, 2) is a strict best reply to 0';. Following any y =J 2, ai and a~ are strict best replies to each other regardless of the first-period actions. Thus, the strategies in 0':'3 are strict best replies to each other in the second period if k is large enough. It follows, since (J'~~ is completely mixed, that (J'~3 is a perfect equilibrium of Cit.
Finally, it is clear that (J'k = ((J'~3' 0'3) converges to a. •
Related Literature
In a series of papers, Lehrer (1990 Lehrer ( , 1991 Lehrer ( , 1992 , introduces the idea of internal correlation, in the setting of undiscounted infinitely-repeated games with deter ministic imperfect public monitoring. These papers consider equilibria in which players use private histories of past play to correlate future choices, in effect con structing "internal" correlating devices. A similar idea underlies our first example, where the first-period actions, together with the signal, correlate second-period play. Since the first-period equilibrium payoffs of the players are independent of their first-period actions in the example, the first-period actions have some of the features of cheap talk announcements. As such, the example is also related to the literature on mediated cheap talk. For instance, Lehrer and Sorin (1997) show that almost any correlated equilibrium outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the extended game obtained by adding a mediator to whom the players send private messages, and who then replies with a public deterministic message, before the original game is played. The mediator in Lehrer and Sorin (1997) has a similar role as the public signal in our example, although its first-period actions are not literally cheap talk.
Like our examples, the examples of Kandori and Obara (2000) show that private sequential outcomes need not be in the convex hull of the set of PPE outcomes. Their examples, unlike our's, are equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounting. The structure of their examples depend on the infinite horizon. Our examples show that there are significant differences between PSE and PPE outcomes even with a finite horizon. Tomala (1999) studies undiscounted infinitely repeated games with public monitoring in which observed deviations may be compatible with several potential deviators. As he points out, the inability to identify deviators can shrink the set of equilibrium payoffs. Our third example, on the other hand, shows the opposite can also occur, i.e., in some games, an inability to identity a deviator can expand the set of equilibrium payoffs.
Finally, the literature has noted another reason why PSE payoffs may differ from PPE payoffs. If there are more than two players, the correlated minmax payoff for a player (i.e., the minmax payoff when opponents can correlate their actions) may be less than the player's standard minmax payoff. Consequently, since correlation may be obtained via private strategies, some repeated games with imperfect public monitoring have PSE payoffs outside the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs, as usually defined. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, exercise 5.10 ) for a simple example and Tomala (1999) for a more detailed discussion.
A. Robustness of the Second Example
We show here that for almost all small perturbations of the payoffs and proba bilities in the example of Section 4, the resulting game has a unique sequential equilibrium: the PPE in which the stage-game equilibrium is played after any history.
We first argue that since the stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium, each player must have identical beliefs over the future behavior of the other player after any private history.
Proposition A. Let a be a Nash equilibrium of a two-player game G(rr, Y), and suppose the stage game G has a unique correlated equilibrium, a"'. Then, when a is played, the equilibrium belief of player i about player j 's second-period action, after any history (at, y) that has positive probability under a, is given by 0';.
Proof. Let y E Y have positive probability under a. When a is played, the realization of y gives rise to a one-shot incomplete information game in the sec ond period. The types of player i in this game are the actions aJ that have positive probability under aI, conditional on y having been realized; denote this subset of A as Ti. The prior distribution, p, on the type space, T It Ti, is the conditional (on y) distribution of first-period action profiles under a l . This construction yields an incomplete information game, (G, T,p) , in which the types are payoff-irrelevant. Since a is a Nash equilibrium, and it puts positive probabil ity on y, it induces a Bayes-Nash equilibrium on (G, T,p 
so that a; is a convex combination of the beliefs a~i for ti E T;. (~). Moreover, We can now discuss the robustness of the example. Let G be a two-player stage game that has a unique correlated equilibrium, 0'*. Let (7r1 Y) be a monitoring structure with non-moving support: 7r(Y Ia) > 0 for all (y,a) E Y x A. Let a «aL af), (a~, a~) ) be a sequential equilibrium of the associated repeated game G(7r, Y). Suppose, as in the example of Section4, that a 1 =1= 0'*. The outcome of a is then not a PPE outcome. This implies that a is a PSE, and by Proposition 1, at least one player, say 2, randomizes in the first period.
In order for player 2 to be willing to randomize in the first period, she must be myopically indifferent over the randomized actions: By Proposition A, every pair (a1, y) on the equilibrium path causes her to have the same beliefs over player l's past play, and so she has the same equilibrium expected payoff in period two. Her myopic indifference can be achieved in one of two ways. First, if a~ is pure (as in our example), al E Al and a2 =1= a~ E A2 exist such that u2 (al,a2) = u2(aI,a~). This is not a generic payoff function.
Alternatively, if a~ is mixed, player 1 randomizes in such a way as to make player 2 indifferent. Then, by the previous paragraph, (a~) ai) is a mixed strategy equilibrium of (u, Ai x A2"), where Af is the support of at and satisfies JAil ~ 2.
For generic assignments of payoffs, JArl IAgl. Fix a value of the public signal, y. Then player 1 has IAn types that arise with positive probability in the game of incomplete information induced by a (described in the proof of Proposition A). By Proposition A, each type of player 1 has the same beliefs over player 2's second-period action. That is, for all at E Ar and a~ E A 2 , L a~(a~ Ia~; y) Pr {a~ IaLy} = a*(a~).
a~EA2
For fixed a~, there are IA! I such equations, simultaneously determining IA21 un knowns, i.e., a~(a~ I~; y). One solution is given by a~(a~ Ia~; y) = (T"(a~). But this solution yields a public strategy for player 2, and so awould be a PPE. Thus, there must another solution, and hence the conditional probability matrix, must be singular. Since and &~ is player 2's strategy in a mixed strategy equilibrium of (u,A! x A2')' the conditional probability matrix is singular only for a nongeneric choice of 1r.
